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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Like our sister courts of appeals, we are asked to 
determine the appropriate standard of review governing 
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. Anthony Matteo seeks 
habeas relief from his state convictions for first degree 
murder, robbery, theft, and possession of marijuana, 
contending the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania violated his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel by using incriminating 
statements he made in two telephone conversations from 
prison to an outside informant. In evaluating Matteo's 
petition, the en banc court must interpret the standard of 
review provision incorporated into 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) by 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
("AEDPA"), which revised the standard of review for habeas 
corpus petitions. We hold that the revised statute mandates 
a two-part inquiry: first, the federal court must inquire 
whether the state court decision was "contrary to" clearly 
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States; second, if it was not, the federal 
court must evaluate whether the state court judgment rests 
upon an objectively unreasonable application of clearly 
established Supreme Court jurisprudence. Applying this 
analysis, we will affirm the District Court's dismissal of 
Matteo's habeas petition. 
 
I. Background 
 
A. Facts 
 
In September 1988, Anthony Matteo was convicted of 
first degree murder, robbery, theft, and possession of 
marijuana and subsequently sentenced to life 
imprisonment on the murder conviction and twenty years' 
consecutive probation on the robbery conviction. The facts 
underlying Matteo's convictions were aptly summarized in 
the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas of Chester 
County, Pennsylvania: 
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         On January 17, 1988, Patrick Calandriello was found 
        dead in the trunk of his Cadillac which was parked in 
        the North parking lot of the Holiday Inn in Lionville, 
        Pennsylvania. Calandriello had been shot in the head 
        with a .22 caliber rifle and stuffed in the trunk of his 
        own car. Although Calandriello had been known to 
        carry large sums of money, usually in large 
        denominations, no money was found on him. 
        Additionally, he was missing both his apartment and 
        his car keys. Investigators also discovered white cat 
        hairs on Calandriello's pants and a sneaker print on 
        the rear bumper of his car. 
 
         The story which ended in Calandriello's death and 
        Matteo's conviction commences in September 1987. 
        Edward Beson, a friend of Calandriello's, testified that 
        Calandriello sought Beson's assistance in storing 
        $20,000 worth of stolen golf carts which Calandriello 
        was soon to acquire. Beson learned from Calandriello 
        that Anthony Matteo was going to obtain these stolen 
        golf carts for Calandriello. 
 
         Apparently, the first of two "attempts" to obtain the 
        stolen golf carts, in September of 1987 and January 5, 
        1988, was unsuccessful. At approximately 11:20 a.m. 
        on January 13, 1988, Calandriello telephoned Beson 
        and stated that he was going to pick up Anthony 
        Matteo at Matteo's house and that he, Calandriello, 
        would be carrying $5,000 or $6,000. Another $15,000 
        was to be left in the care of Calandriello's friend 
        Richard Ross. Calandriello told Beson that he would 
        meet Beson at 2:00 p.m. that afternoon at Denny's 
        Restaurant, but Calandriello never arrived. 
 
         Shortly after noon on January 13, 1998, Calandriello 
        did indeed leave $15,000 in an envelope with Richard 
        Ross at a Roy Rogers Restaurant in Paoli. Calandriello 
        told Ross that he was going to Routes 401 and 113 to 
        pick someone up and that he would return in 
        approximately forty-five minutes to an hour; Matteo's 
        home is nearby this intersection. Ross awaited 
        Calandriello's return for over three hours before he 
        gave up and left the Roy Rogers Restaurant. 
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         Sara Kessock, Calandriello's girlfriend, reported 
       Calandriello missing and an investigation of his 
       disappearance ensued. Eventually, the investigation led 
        to Anthony Matteo, and the police conducted two 
        searches of the Matteo home. The searches revealed 
        the following: 
 
         1. In Defendant's room was .22 ammo consistent 
        with the type that killed Calandriello; 
 
         2. In Defendant's room were sets of Calandriel lo's car 
        and apartment keys; 
 
         3. Under the mattress in Defendant's brother's  room 
        was $1,200 in $100 bills; 
 
         4. At the Matteo house was a white cat whose h air 
        was consistent with the hairs found on Calandriello's 
        pants; 
 
         5. In Defendant's room were sneakers that an F BI 
        expert was "90% to 95% certain" were the sneakers 
        that made the print on Calandriello's car's rear 
        bumper; and 
 
         6. Blood was found in the defendant's garage t hat 
        was consistent with Calandriello's and only 3% of the 
        rest of the population. 
 
         Crucial testimony was provided by a number of 
        Matteo's friends. First, Timothy Flynn stated that he 
        and the Defendant had gone target shooting on 
        January 10, 1988. Flynn also stated that on the 
        evening of January 13, 1988, the Defendant was 
        carrying a wad of bills and was spending $100 bills. 
 
         Next, C. John Stanchina, a longtime friend of the 
        Defendant's, testified that at approximately 2:25 p.m. 
        on January 13, 1988, he picked up the Defendant at 
        the North end parking lot of the Holiday Inn in 
        Lionville. As it would turn out, this was near where 
        Calandriello's frozen body was later discovered. 
 
         Finally, Douglas Lubking testified that he had lent 
        the Defendant a .22 rifle in December of 1987. Lubking 
        and the Defendant had been target shooting and 
        Defendant asked Lubking to loan Defendant the rifle so 
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        he could practice. Subsequent to his arrest for murder, 
        the Defendant called Lubking from the Chester County 
        Prison. The Defendant told Lubking that he had hidden 
        Lubking's rifle near the Defendant's home. Defendant 
        asked Lubking to retrieve the .22 rifle and to hide it in 
        Lubking's attic. Defendant also instructed Lubking to 
        tell the police and Defendant's own attorneys that 
        Lubking did not own a .22 rifle. As a bribe, Defendant 
        offered $1,500 worth of cocaine if he would retrieve the 
        gun. As a result of Defendant's instructions, the gun 
        was located by the police on February 1, 1988. It was 
        this same gun which was later identified by Timothy 
        Flynn as the gun with which Defendant had been 
        target shooting on January 10, 1988. This gun was 
        found to be consistent with the type of gun that killed 
        Calandriello. 
 
Commonwealth v. Matteo, No. 419-88, mem. op. at 1-4 (Pa. 
C.C.P. Mar. 19, 1990). 
 
Of particular importance in this appeal are the telephone 
conversations between Matteo and Lubking that took place 
after Matteo's arrest. The evidence in the record shows that 
on January 28, 1988, Matteo called Lubking from prison 
and asked him to retrieve the rifle that Matteo had 
borrowed from Lubking shortly before Calandriello's 
murder. Matteo told Lubking that he had nothing to do 
with Patrick Calandriello's murder, but that he had hidden 
the rifle so that Lubking would not become a suspect. 
Lubking responded that he wanted to consult with an 
attorney before deciding what to do. He told Matteo to call 
him back the following evening at 8:30 p.m. 
 
The next morning, January 29, 1988, Lubking met with 
an attorney, who advised him to inform the Chester County 
District Attorney's office of his conversation with Matteo. 
Lubking did so, meeting with Chester County detectives 
that afternoon. During that meeting, Lubking provided 
written consent to let police intercept and record the 
anticipated phone call from Matteo that night. The 
detectives instructed Lubking that he was not to ask 
questions or otherwise elicit information from Matteo. 
 
As expected, Matteo called Lubking around 8:30 that 
evening. The police recorded the conversation. At trial, 
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Lubking identified the recorded voices as his and Matteo's. 
The conversation, which need not be reproduced in full 
here, consists mainly of Matteo instructing Lubking on how 
to retrieve the rifle as Lubking provides brief 
acknowledgments of understanding: 
 
        MATTEO: I got rid of that [the rifle], and  I put it 
        outside. Any damage that the weather has done to it, 
        I will replace. Okay? 
 
        LUBKING: Okay. 
 
        MATTEO: If it has. So I just don't want you gettin g 
        nervous too. So if anybody asks, you don't have a .22 
        and you didn't -- eh-eh, what do you call. All right? 
 
        LUBKING: Uh-huh. 
 
        * * * * * 
 
        MATTEO: Ahm -- ah -- when are you able to go g et it, 
        from when I tell you to get it. 
 
        LUBKING: As soon as possible. I want this thing-- I 
        want it here. 
 
        MATTEO: Can you leave right now to get it? 
 
        LUBKING: Yeah. 
 
        MATTEO: Okay. Now I'm going to tell you where it's  at, 
        but you got to leave this instant to get it . . . . And once 
        you get it, clean it up and just like, you know, put it 
        away in your attic or something. 
 
Matteo then suggested that Lubking fabricate a pretense to 
drop something off at Matteo's house, so that Lubking 
could retrieve the rifle while there. At this point in the 
conversation, Lubking's extremely brief responses-- he had 
been instructed not to elicit information -- aroused 
Matteo's suspicion: 
 
        MATTEO: What's the matter? Why do you seem so 
        hesitant? 
 
        LUBKING: No. I'm not hesitant. I'm just -- 
 
        MATTEO: You just make me nervous. 
 
        LUBKING: Sorry. 
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        * * * 
 
        MATTEO: What's the matter? 
 
        LUBKING: Nothing. 
 
        MATTEO: You're sure? 
 
        LUBKING: I'm positive. 
 
        MATTEO: I don't want to be getting set up here too. 
 
        LUBKING: No. Don't worry about it. 
 
        MATTEO: I'm worrying about it. Okay? 
 
        LUBKING: Okay. Yeah. I want this -- I don't-- I want 
        this out of the way. 
 
        MATTEO: Okay. 
 
        LUBKING: That's why I'm nervous. I just want it ou t of 
        the way. 
 
His fears allayed, Matteo proceeded to give Lubking detailed 
instructions on how to find the rifle, which was buried 
under the snow in Matteo's back yard. 
 
        MATTEO: Okay. I'm gonna do it. Are you ready? 
 
        LUBKING: Uh-huh. 
 
        MATTEO: Go in my driveway. Okay. You know how 
        you go down a dirt road and you come to that little tiny 
        bridge? 
 
        LUBKING: Uh-huh. 
 
        MATTEO: All right. Well, you stop your car and tur n 
        your lights off, leave your car running. 
 
        LUBKING: Uh-huh. 
 
        * * * * 
 
        MATTEO: You go onto the right-hand side of the roa d, 
        the passenger side of the road, and you go down. And 
        on the side of the right, on the side, there's like a 
        cement wall going down into the water. 
 
        LUBKING: Uh-huh. 
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        MATTEO: Right next to the cement wall is where it' s 
        at, but you got to dig through the snow to get to it. 
 
        LUBKING: Okay. 
 
        MATTEO: You get out of the car. You go around the 
        front of the car with your lights off and you go to the 
        railing. 
 
        LUBKING: The driver's side? 
 
        MATTEO: By the passenger's side. 
 
        LUBKING: Uh, okay. 
 
        MATTEO: You gotta go around the front of the car i f 
        you're facing forward. 
 
        LUBKING: Uh-huh. 
 
        MATTEO: Okay. Go around the -- go down the, you 
        know, it's like a steep little incline, an incline going 
        down. 
 
        LUBKING: Yeah. 
 
        MATTEO: Right on that incline there's like a littl e 
        cement wall, I believe. And it's right next to that. And 
        it's under the snow, so you gotta, you know, bury it. 
        And make sure nobody sees you do it. Okay? Open the 
        trunk. Throw it in the trunk. Okay. Don't put it in the 
        back of your car. Throw it in the trunk. I don't care 
        how wet it is, through it in the trunk. And then leave, 
        then go put it in your attic. All right? So then nobody 
        will bother you. 
 
        LUBKING: All right. 
 
        MATTEO: And if anybody asks, you know, you don't 
        have one. Now, when can you do this? 
 
        LUBKING: Right now. 
 
The two agreed that Matteo would call Lubking again at 
10:00 p.m. 
 
After the conversation ended, police went to Matteo's 
house with Lubking and searched the backyard for the rifle. 
Despite Matteo's instructions, however, they were unable to 
find it. The police and Lubking then returned to Lubking's 
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home and awaited Matteo's call. It appears the police gave 
Lubking no further instructions at this time. As arranged, 
Matteo called Lubking again at 10:00 p.m. and police 
recorded the call: 
 
        LUBKING: Yeah? 
 
        MATTEO: It's Anthony. What's up? 
 
        LUBKING: I couldn't find it. You oughta get-- I need 
        more explicit -- this is -- 
 
        MATTEO: What did you say? 
 
        LUBKING: I could not find it. 
 
        MATTEO: What do you mean you couldn't find it? 
 
        LUBKING: Well, you said the bridge. 
 
        MATTEO: Yeah. 
 
        LUBKING: And there's two bridges there. There's a 
        sewer pipe and there's -- 
 
        MATTEO: You got to speak up. I can hardly hear you. 
 
        LUBKING: There's a sewer pipe. 
 
        MATTEO: A big -- real, real huge one? 
 
        LUBKING: Yeah. 
 
        MATTEO: Yeah. It goes under that cement bridge. 
 
        LUBKING: Yeah. On the far side, on the -- all th e way 
        closer to your house? 
 
        MATTEO: Okay. You're talking -- I'm talking-- you 
        drive on the road, right, you're driving on the road. 
 
        LUBKING: Right. 
 
        MATTEO: And you come to the cement bridge with the 
        two railings on either side. 
 
        LUBKING: Pardon me? 
 
        MATTEO: Is there two railings on either side? 
 
        LUBKING: Yeah. 
 
        MATTEO: All right. 
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        LUBKING: That's -- that's a stone bridge. 
 
        MATTEO: Yeah. That's what I'm talking about. 
 
        LUBKING: Oh, okay. 
 
The conversation continued in this vein, as Matteo 
attempted to explain exactly where he had hidden the rifle 
and Lubking asked various clarifying questions. The two 
agreed to speak again later that night or the next evening. 
After the conversation, police returned to Matteo's property 
-- this time without Lubking -- and successfully located 
the rifle. Both the rifle and the recorded conversations were 
admitted into evidence at Matteo's trial. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
As noted, following a jury trial in the Chester County 
Court of Commons Pleas, Matteo was convicted of all 
charges and sentenced accordingly. The Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania affirmed his convictions, see Commonwealth 
v. Matteo, 589 A.2d 1175 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), and the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied his Petition for 
Allowance of Appeal, see Commonwealth v. Matteo, 604 
A.2d 1030 (Pa. 1992), and Petition for Reconsideration. 
 
On November 30, 1994, Matteo filed a petition for habeas 
corpus relief in United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania. The District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge's recommendation that Matteo's petition 
be dismissed unless Matteo withdrew two unexhausted 
claims. After Matteo declined to do so, the District Court 
dismissed the petition and later denied Matteo's request for 
reinstatement of the petition. 
 
In September 1996, Matteo's new counsel filed another 
petition for habeas relief, alleging that his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel had been violated by the 
wiretapping of his two telephone conversations with 
Lubking. The Magistrate Judge recommended that his 
petition be denied on the grounds that Matteo's right to 
counsel had not attached at the time of the telephone calls. 
The District Court dismissed the petition, but on different 
grounds, holding that under Massiah v. United States, 377 
U.S. 201 (1964), Lubking had not acted as a government 
agent and the police had not deliberately elicited 
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incriminating information from Matteo. See Matteo v. 
Superintendent, No. 96-6041, mem. op. at 10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 
25, 1996). We granted Matteo's request for a certificate of 
appealability; following oral argument before a panel but 
prior to the issuance of an opinion, the case was listed for 
rehearing en banc pursuant to Rule 9.4.1 of our Internal 
Operating Procedure. See Matteo v. Superintendent, 144 
F.3d 882 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
II. Interpretation of AEDPA 
 
Matteo's argument on appeal is that his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel was violated by the state's 
elicitation of the location of the rifle. Before addressing the 
merits, however, we must determine the appropriate 
standard of review. Specifically, we must discern the 
meaning of 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) (West Supp. 1998) as 
amended by the Antiterrorisim and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
The amended section provides, in part: 
 
        (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on 
        behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment 
        of a State court shall not be granted with respect to 
        any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State 
        court proceedings unless the adjudication of that 
        claim-- 
 
         (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary t o, or 
        involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
        established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
        Court of the United States; or 
 
         (2) resulted in a decision that was based on a n 
        unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
        evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) (West Supp. 1998). The proper 
interpretation of this language has been the subject of 
much debate, engendering at least three distinct 
approaches among the federal courts of appeals. The crux 
of the debate has been what degree of deference, if any, 
AEDPA requires a federal habeas court to accord a state 
court's construction of federal constitutional issues and 
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interpretation of Supreme Court precedent. Previously, 
federal habeas courts were not required to "pay any special 
heed to the underlying state court decision." O'Brien v. 
Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Brown v. 
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953)). That is no longer the case 
-- the text of section 2254(d) firmly establishes the state 
court decision as the starting point in habeas review. But 
the precise extent of the changes wrought by AEDPA 
remains to be determined. Because this is a matter of first 
impression in our court of appeals, we begin by examining 
how other courts have interpreted the provisions at issue. 
 
A. Approaches of Other Circuits 
 
In O'Brien, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held 
that AEDPA does not require uniform deference to state 
court decisions but "restricts the armamentarium of legal 
rules available to a federal habeas court in evaluating a 
state court judgment" by "confin[ing] the set of relevant 
rules to those `clearly established by the Supreme Court.' " 
145 F.3d at 23. As such, the First Circuit held, AEDPA did 
not codify the Supreme Court's decision in Teague v. Lane, 
489 U.S. 288 (1989), but "embrace[d] one of its primary 
goals," namely, preventing federal habeas courts from 
requiring state courts to act as "innovators in the field of 
criminal procedure." O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 23. Accordingly, 
the O'Brien approach interprets AEDPA to require a two- 
step inquiry. First, under section 2254(d)(1) the federal 
habeas court "asks whether the Supreme Court has 
prescribed a rule that governs the petitioner's claim. If so, 
the habeas court gauges whether the state court decision is 
`contrary to' the governing rule." Id. at 24. Under this 
formulation, "contrary to" analysis applies only if the 
Supreme Court has articulated a rule that governs the 
claim, though factual identity is not required: 
 
        [A]n affirmative answer to the first section 2254(d)(1) 
        inquiry -- whether the Supreme Court has prescribed 
        a rule that governs the petitioner's claim -- requires 
        something more than a recognition that the Supreme 
        Court has articulated a general standard that covers 
        the claim. To obtain relief at this stage, a habeas 
        petitioner must show that Supreme Court precedent 
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        requires an outcome contrary to that reached by the 
        relevant state court. 
 
         We caution that this criterion should not be applied 
        in too rigid a manner. A petitioner need not point a 
        habeas court to a factually identical precedent. 
        Oftentimes, Supreme Court holdings are "general" in 
        the sense that they erect a framework specifically 
        intended for application to variant factual situations. 
        These rules sufficiently shape the contours of an 
        appropriate analysis of a claim of constitutional error 
        to merit review of a state court's decision under section 
        2254(d)(1)'s "contrary to" prong. 
 
Id. at 24-25 (citations omitted). 
 
The second step of the O'Brien approach is necessary 
only if no Supreme Court rule governs the petitioner's 
claim. Then, the federal habeas court is required to 
determine whether the state court decision involved an 
"unreasonable application of" clearly established federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court. See id. at 24. 
The writ of habeas corpus should be granted only if the 
state court decision was "so offensive to existing precedent, 
so devoid of record support, or so arbitrary, as to indicate 
that it is outside the universe of plausible, credible 
outcomes." Id. at 25 (citing Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 
742, 748-49 (7th Cir. 1997)). Applying this analysis, the 
O'Brien court upheld the state court's decision that the 
scope of recross examination had not violated the 
petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights. See O'Brien, 145 F.3d 
at 27. 
 
A different analysis was propounded by the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Green v. French, 143 F.3d 
865 (4th Cir. 1998). The Green court held that a decision is 
"contrary to" Supreme Court precedent when"either 
through a decision of pure law or the application of law to 
facts indistinguishable in any material way from those on 
the basis of which the precedent was decided, that decision 
reaches a legal conclusion or a result opposite to and 
irreconcilable with that reached in the precedent that 
addresses the identical issue." Id. at 870. The court further 
explicated the meaning of "contrary to" as follows: 
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         A lower court's decision . . . certainly is said to be 
        "contrary to" supreme court precedent when, through 
        the resolution of a question of pure law, that decision 
        reaches a legal conclusion or a result opposite to that 
        reached in a supreme court opinion which addresses 
        the identical question of law. A lower court's decision is 
        likewise "contrary to" a higher court's precedent when 
        that decision correctly identifies the governing legal 
        principle from the precedent but applies that principle 
        to facts that are indistinguishable in any material 
        respect from those on the basis of which the precedent 
        was decided in such a way as to reach a conclusion 
        different from that reached by the higher court. It is 
        also common to characterize a lower court decision as 
        "contrary to" supreme court precedent when that 
        decision applies a precedent in a factual context 
        different from the one in which the precedent was 
        decided and one to which extension of the legal 
        principle of the precedent is indisputably unjustified, 
        or, conversely, when that decision fails to apply a 
        precedent in a different context to which the 
        precedent's principle clearly does apply. 
 
Id. at 869. 
 
Under Green, "unreasonable application of " Supreme 
Court precedent occurs when the state court decision 
 
        applies a precedent in a context different from the one 
        in which the precedent was decided and one to which 
        extension of the legal principle of the precedent is not 
        reasonable, when that decision fails to apply the 
        principle of a precedent in a context where such failure 
        is unreasonable, or when that decision recognizes the 
        correct principle from the higher court's precedent, but 
        unreasonably applies that principle to the facts before 
        it (assuming the facts are insufficiently different from 
        those that gave rise to the precedent as to constitute a 
        new context for consideration of the principle's 
        applicability). 
 
Id. at 870; see also Davis v. Kramer, 167 F.3d 494, 500 & 
n.8 (9th Cir. 1999) (employing a similar analysis). Thus, 
under this approach "unreasonable application of" clearly 
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established Supreme Court encompasses three distinct 
scenarios: (1) the state court extends Supreme Court 
precedent to cover a new factual context in which 
application of the precedent is unreasonable; (2) the state 
court unreasonably fails to apply a precedent in a factual 
context that warrants its application; or (3) the state court 
applies the correct precedent, but unreasonably in light of 
the facts of the case before it. Of course, all three scenarios 
require a definition of "unreasonable"; in the Fourth 
Circuit's view, the habeas court must inquire whether "the 
state courts have decided the question by interpreting or 
applying the relevant precedent in a manner that 
reasonable jurists would all agree is reasonable." Id. 
 
Yet a third distinct approach has been espoused by the 
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh 
Circuits, which interpret AEDPA to require a distinction 
between pure questions of law, which are reviewed de novo, 
and mixed questions of law and fact, which receive more 
deferential treatment. See Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 
924 (11th Cir. 1998); Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 768; Lindh v. 
Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd 
on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).1 As explained by the 
Fifth Circuit in Drinkard, this approach is premised on the 
view that courts resolve three types of questions: questions 
of law, questions of fact, and mixed questions of law and 
fact. See 97 F.3d at 767. Section 2254(d)(2) appears to 
apply solely to questions of fact: it allows habeas relief 
where the state court decision "was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 
U.S.C. S 2254(d)(2) (West Supp. 1998). Thus, as these 
courts read it, section 2254(d)(1) must cover questions of 
law and mixed questions of law and fact. These courts 
interpret the "contrary to law" provision as governing 
questions of pure law and the "unreasonable application 
of " provision as applying to mixed questions of law and 
fact. Accordingly, they apply de novo review to questions of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Seventh Circuit developed the bifurcated approach in Lindh, but 
more recently appears to have abandoned it. See Hall v. Washington, 106 
F.3d 742, 748 (7th Cir. 1997); see also O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 21 n.4 
(noting the discrepancy between Lindh and Hall). 
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pure law, which fall within the "contrary to" clause, and a 
more deferential standard to mixed questions falling within 
the "unreasonable application of" clause. 
 
B. Analysis 
 
As several courts have recognized, the text of AEDPA 
offers little guidance to the courts charged with applying it. 
See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) ("[I]n a 
world of silk purses and pigs' ears, [AEDPA] is not a silk 
purse of the art of statutory drafting."); O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 
20 (noting that AEDPA is "hardly a model of clarity . . . and 
its standard of review provision is far from self-explicating"). 
Nevertheless, we must begin our analysis with the words of 
the statute. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 
144 (1995). Section 2254(d) states that applications for 
habeas corpus relief "shall not be granted" unless one of 
the conditions set forth in subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2) is 
met. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) (West Supp. 1998). These 
conditions, as demarcated by AEDPA, are twofold:first, 
habeas corpus relief is warranted when the state 
adjudication resulted in a decision that was "contrary to" or 
an "unreasonable application of" clearly established federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court, see id.  
S 2254(d)(1); second, relief is warranted when the state 
adjudication resulted in a decision that was "based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence." Id. S 2254(d)(2). Only the first -- section 
2254(d)(1) -- is at issue in this appeal. 
 
Consequently, our task is to discern the meaning of the 
phrases "contrary to" and "unreasonable application of " as 
used in AEDPA. The two may overlap, but we must attempt 
to read the statute so that each has some operative effect, 
see United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 
(1992), and we must assume the legislative purpose "is 
expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used," 
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962); see also 
Green, 143 F.3d at 870 ("[A]ccording each term its most 
natural (even if not its only) meaning, results in an 
interpretation of [AEDPA] most faithful to the plain purpose 
of the statute."). 
 
As noted, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of AEDPA 
attempts to catalogue the situations in which a result might 
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be "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" a 
higher court's precedent. See 143 F.3d at 869-70. The 
Green court held that a decision is "contrary to" precedent 
when "either through a decision of pure law or the 
application of law to facts indistinguishable in any material 
way from those on the basis of which the precedent was 
decided, that decision reaches a legal conclusion or a result 
opposite to and irreconcilable with that reached in the 
precedent that addresses the identical issue." Id. at 870. 
The court also held that a decision constitutes an 
"unreasonable application of" the relevant law when it 
unjustifiably extends the precedent's legal principle to a 
new context, fails to apply the principle in a context where 
such failure is "unreasonable," or identifies the correct 
principle but unreasonably applies it to the facts before it 
(assuming those facts are not so different as to"constitute 
a new context for consideration of the principle's 
applicability"). Id. Although we find this analysis insightful, 
we decline to adopt it as the basis for scrutinizing state 
court judgments under AEDPA. We believe that in practice, 
it will be difficult for a court to determine which, if any, of 
the foregoing scenarios is implicated in the case before it. In 
our view, a better analytical framework is provided by the 
First Circuit in O'Brien, which directs federal habeas courts 
first to identify whether the Supreme Court has articulated 
a rule specific enough to trigger "contrary to" review; and 
second, only if it has not, to evaluate whether the state 
court unreasonably applied the relevant body of precedent. 
See 145 F.3d at 24-25. 
 
Consequently, we hold that the "contrary to" provision of 
AEDPA requires a federal habeas court first to identify the 
applicable Supreme Court precedent and determine 
whether it resolves the petitioner's claim. Like the First 
Circuit, we believe this analysis requires "something more 
than a recognition that the Supreme Court has articulated 
a general standard that covers the claim." Id. at 24. 
Instead, the inquiry must be whether the Supreme Court 
has established a rule that determines the outcome of the 
petition. Accordingly, we adopt O'Brien's holding that "[t]o 
obtain relief at this stage, a habeas petitioner must show 
that Supreme Court precedent requires an outcome 
contrary to that reached by the relevant state court." Id. at 
 
                                19 
  
24-25. In other words, it is not sufficient for the petitioner 
to show merely that his interpretation of Supreme Court 
precedent is more plausible than the state court's; rather, 
the petitioner must demonstrate that Supreme Court 
precedent requires the contrary outcome. This standard 
precludes granting habeas relief solely on the basis of 
simple disagreement with a reasonable state court 
interpretation of the applicable precedent. 
 
We also emphasize that it is not necessary for the 
petitioner to cite factually identical Supreme Court 
precedent. Rather, the critical question is "whether a 
Supreme Court rule -- by virtue of its factual similarity 
(though not necessarily identicality) or its distillation of 
general federal law precepts into a channeled mode of 
analysis specifically intended for application to variant 
factual situations -- can fairly be said to require a 
particular result in a particular case." Id. at 25. 
 
If the federal habeas court determines that the state 
court decision was not "contrary to" the applicable body of 
Supreme Court law -- either because the state court 
decision complies with the Supreme Court rule governing 
the claim, or because no such rule has been established -- 
then the federal habeas court should undertake the second 
step of analyzing whether the decision was based on an 
"unreasonable application of " Supreme Court precedent. 
We agree with the First Circuit's observation that"the 
`unreasonable application' clause does not empower a 
habeas court to grant the writ merely because it disagrees 
with the state court's decision, or because, left to its own 
devices, it would have reached a different result." O'Brien, 
145 F.3d at 25; see also Neelley, 138 F.3d at 924 ("[T]he 
mere fact that a district court disagrees with a state court 
does not render that state court's decision `unreasonable'; 
certainly two courts can differ over the proper resolution of 
a close question without either viewpoint being 
unreasonable."); Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 334 (7th 
Cir. 1997) ("[T]he fact that we might disagree with the state 
court's determination . . . would not carry the day."). To 
hold otherwise would resemble de novo review, which we 
believe is proscribed by the statute. But we depart from the 
First Circuit in our understanding of what constitutes an 
 
                                20 
  
"unreasonable application" of clearly established federal 
law. As noted, O'Brien holds that a state court's application 
of law is unreasonable only if it is "so offensive to existing 
precedent, so devoid of record support, or so arbitrary, as 
to indicate that it is outside the universe of plausible, 
credible outcomes." 145 F.3d at 25. This definition 
seemingly would exclude all but the most implausible of 
holdings. As a practical matter, we believe its effect would 
be to render the "unreasonable application" clause a virtual 
nullity, as granting habeas relief would require an explicit 
finding that the state court decision -- often, a decision of 
the state's highest court -- was so far off the mark as to 
suggest judicial incompetence. 
 
We find the same flaw in the standard espoused by the 
Fourth and Fifth Circuits. As noted, their approach 
inquires whether a reasonable jurist could reach the result 
in question. See Green, 143 F.3d at 870 ("[H]abeas relief is 
authorized only when the state courts have decided the 
question by interpreting or applying the relevant precedent 
in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is 
unreasonable."); Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 769 ("[A]n application 
of law to facts is unreasonable only when it can be said 
that reasonable jurists considering the question would be of 
one view that the state court ruling was correct. In other 
words, we can grant habeas relief only if a state court 
decision is so clearly incorrect that it would not be 
debatable among reasonable jurists.") We believe a "no 
reasonable jurist" definition unduly discourages the 
granting of relief insofar as it requires the federal habeas 
court to hold that the state court judges acted in a way that 
no reasonable jurists would under the circumstances. As 
such, it has the tendency to focus attention on the 
reasonableness of the jurists rather than the merits of the 
decision itself. For example, in Drinkard one member of the 
panel dissented from the majority's interpretation of the 
petitioner's constitutional claim; the court expressly relied 
on this disagreement as the basis for concluding that the 
state court's application of the law was not unreasonable. 
See 97 F.3d at 769. 
 
We do not believe AEDPA requires such unanimity of 
opinion. Nor do we think it entails an examination of 
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whether the jurists responsible for the state court decision 
are reasonable: such an approach, like that of O'Brien, 
would doubtless lead to the denial of virtually all petitions. 
Rather, we hold the appropriate question is whether the 
state court's application of Supreme Court precedent was 
objectively unreasonable. The federal habeas court should 
not grant the petition unless the state court decision, 
evaluated objectively and on the merits, resulted in an 
outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing 
Supreme Court precedent. In making this determination, 
mere disagreement with the state court's conclusions is not 
enough to warrant habeas relief. Furthermore, although 
AEDPA refers to "clearly established Federal law, `as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' " 
28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1) (West Supp. 1998), we do not believe 
federal habeas courts are precluded from considering the 
decisions of the inferior federal courts when evaluating 
whether the state court's application of the law was 
reasonable. See O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 25 ("To the extent that 
inferior federal courts have decided factually similar cases, 
reference to those decisions is appropriate in assessing the 
reasonableness vel non of the state court's treatment of the 
contested issue."). Instead, the primary significance of the 
phrase "as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States" is that federal courts may not grant habeas corpus 
relief based on the state court's failure to adhere to the 
precedent of a lower federal court on an issue that the 
Supreme Court has not addressed. Thus, in certain cases 
it may be appropriate to consider the decisions of inferior 
federal courts as helpful amplifications of Supreme Court 
precedent. 
 
We believe this interpretation is supported by AEDPA's 
legislative history, which indicates Congress sought to 
preserve independent review of federal constitutional 
claims, but to curtail its scope by mandating deference to 
reasonable state court decisions. Explaining the 
"unreasonable application" provision, Senator Hatch, the 
bill's primary sponsor, stated: 
 
        What does this mean? It means that if the State court 
        reasonably applied Federal law, its decision must be 
        upheld. Why is that a problematic standard? After all, 
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        Federal habeas review exists to correct fundamental 
        defects in the law. If the State court decision has 
        reasonably applied Federal law it is hard to say that a 
        fundamental defect exists. 
 
141 Cong. Rec. S7848 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement 
of Sen. Hatch). Another of the bill's sponsors, Senator 
Specter, observed that "under the bill deference will be 
owed to State courts' decisions on the application of Federal 
law to the facts. Unless it is unreasonable, a State court's 
decision applying the law to the facts will be upheld." 142 
Cong. Rec. S3472 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of 
Sen. Specter). These and other statements from the 
legislative history persuade us that Congress intended to 
restrict habeas relief to cases in which the state court 
judgment rested upon an objectively flawed interpretation 
of Supreme Court precedent. See also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
104-518, at 111 (1996) (stating that AEDPA "requires 
deference to the determinations of state courts that are 
neither `contrary to,' nor an `unreasonable application of,' 
clearly established federal law"). As one commentator 
accurately recounts, in both houses of Congress section 
2254(d) "was called a `deference' standard by every member 
who spoke on the question, opponents as well as 
supporters." Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, 
Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 
888, 945 (1998). 
 
Regarding the objective nature of the standard, we believe 
our reading comports with pre-AEDPA law in this area, 
which was governed primarily by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 
288 (1989). There, the Supreme Court held that a federal 
court cannot grant habeas relief to a petitioner based on a 
rule announced after his conviction and sentence became 
final. See id. at 311. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
recognized that "the Teague doctrine`validates reasonable, 
good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by 
state courts . . . .' " O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 
(1997) (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990)).2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although the Teague doctrine was supplemented by the passage of 
AEDPA, Teague continues to be applied in its own right. See, e.g., Breard 
v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (applying Teague to a post-AEDPA 
habeas petition). 
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The test of reasonableness in this context is objective, not 
subjective: "Reasonableness, in this as in many other 
contexts, is an objective standard." O'Dell , 521 U.S. at 156 
(quoting Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 237 (1992)). 
 
Of course, we recognize that an "objective 
unreasonableness" test will fail to dictate an obvious result 
in many cases. But we believe the same would be true 
under any faithful reading of the statute. Notions of 
reasonableness abound in the law and are not ordinarily 
considered problematic, despite their imprecision. See Bell 
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (observing, in the 
Fourth Amendment context, that "the test of 
reasonableness . . . is not capable of precise definition or 
mechanical application"), quoted in Graham v. Connor, 490 
U.S. 386, 396 (1989). As the Seventh Circuit recently 
observed, the "unreasonable application of " standard 
admits of no a fortiori definition: "None of this answers the 
question when a departure is so great as to be 
`unreasonable,' for that questions lacks an abstract answer 
. . . . Questions of degree -- like questions about the proper 
use of `discretion' -- lack answers to which the labels `right' 
and `wrong' may be attached." Lindh, 96 F.3d at 871. Thus, 
the imprecision of the "objective unreasonableness" test 
does not pose an insurmountable obstacle; indeed, we 
believe it is the intended result of the statutory language. 
 
To summarize, we adopt the First Circuit's view that 
section 2254(d)(1) requires a two-step analysis. First, the 
federal habeas court must determine whether the state 
court decision was "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent 
that governs the petitioner's claim. Relief is appropriate 
only if the petitioner shows that "Supreme Court precedent 
requires an outcome contrary to that reached by the 
relevant state court." O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 24-25. In the 
absence of such a showing, the federal habeas court must 
ask whether the state court decision represents an 
"unreasonable application of" Supreme Court precedent: 
that is, whether the state court decision, evaluated 
objectively and on the merits, resulted in an outcome that 
cannot reasonably be justified. If so, then the petition 
should be granted. 
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With this analytical framework in place, we turn to the 
merits of Matteo's petition. 
 
III. Matteo's Sixth Amendment Claim 
 
Matteo's sole argument on the merits is that the taping, 
and subsequent use in evidence, of his two telephone 
conversations with Lubking deprived him of his right to 
counsel as secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth 
Amendment provides in part that "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. 
amend. VI. Relying on Massiah v. United States , 377 U.S. 
201 (1964) and its progeny, Matteo claims the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court's rejection of his Sixth Amendment 
argument was both "contrary to" and an "unreasonable 
application of " relevant Supreme Court precedent. 
 
In Massiah, the Supreme Court held that deliberate 
elicitation of incriminating statements by a government 
agent, outside the presence of a charged defendant's 
attorney, violates the Sixth Amendment. Federal agents had 
secured the cooperation of an informant who agreed to let 
the agents place a radio transmitter underneath the seat of 
his car. An agent then overheard a conversation between 
Massiah and the informant, in which Massiah made several 
incriminating remarks about his drug importation 
activities. At trial, the agent was permitted to testify as to 
what he overheard on the radio transmitter, and Massiah 
was convicted. The Supreme Court overturned his 
conviction, holding that "the petitioner was denied the basic 
protections of [the Sixth Amendment] guarantee when there 
was used against him at his trial evidence of his own 
incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately 
elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the 
absence of his counsel." 377 U.S. at 206. In a subsequent 
line of cases, the Court developed the Massiah  doctrine 
governing the constitutionality of these so-called"secret 
interrogations." The cases establish three basic 
requirements for finding a Sixth Amendment violation: (1) 
the right to counsel must have attached at the time of the 
alleged infringement; (2) the informant must have been 
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acting as a "government agent"; and (3) the informant must 
have engaged in "deliberate elicitation" of incriminating 
information from the defendant. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 
474 U.S. 159, 170-71 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 
U.S. 264, 269-270 (1980). We will review each separately to 
determine whether the state court's conclusion withstands 
scrutiny under AEDPA. 
 
A. Attachment of the Right to Counsel 
 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court did not explicitly 
address whether Matteo's right to counsel had attached at 
the time in question. It did, however, analyze whether 
Lubking acted as a government agent and deliberately 
elicited information from Matteo. Because such an analysis 
would be unnecessary if Matteo's right to counsel had not 
attached, we believe the state court implicitly concluded 
that it had. 
 
Generally, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
attaches "only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial 
proceedings against the defendant." United States v. 
Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984); see also Estelle v. 
Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-70 (1981); Moore v. Illinois 434 
U.S. 220, 226 (1977); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 
398 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972). Such 
proceedings include "formal charge, preliminary hearing, 
indictment, information, or arraignment." Kirby, 406 U.S. at 
689. The right also may attach at earlier stages, when "the 
accused is confronted, just as at trial, by the procedural 
system, or by his expert adversary, or by both, in a 
situation where the results of the confrontation might well 
settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere 
formality." Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 189 (citations omitted). The 
crucial point is that the defendant is guaranteed the 
protection of counsel from the moment he "finds himself 
faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and 
immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural 
criminal law." Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689. 
 
At the time of Matteo's two telephone conversations, 
which took place on January 29-30, 1988, Matteo had been 
arrested and incarcerated for over a week. He had retained 
a lawyer, who ultimately represented him through the trial. 
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Matteo's preliminary hearing took place on February 12, 
1988; the district attorney filed an information on March 3, 
1988; and the arraignment was held on March 4, 1988. 
Citing these facts, the Magistrate Judge recommended 
denial of Matteo's petition on the grounds that his right to 
counsel had not yet attached. The District Court held 
otherwise, ruling that the right to counsel had attached but 
denying the petition on other grounds. See Matteo, mem. 
op. at 3. 
 
We hold that Matteo's right to counsel had attached at 
the time of the telephone conversations. By this time 
Matteo had undergone preliminary arraignment. 
Additionally, he "was in custody as a result of an arrest 
warrant charging him with the murder, and he was, in fact, 
represented by counsel from the day he surrendered." Id. at 
2-3. Moreover, both before and after the telephone calls, 
Matteo was confronted with the organized resources of an 
ongoing police investigation by agents who were well aware 
of his legal representation. Under these circumstances, we 
believe Matteo's right to counsel had attached and he was 
entitled to the full protection of the Sixth Amendment. 
 
B. Lubking's Status as a Government Agent 
 
The state court concluded that Lubking did not act as a 
government agent at the time of his two telephone 
conversations with Matteo. Applying our AEDPA analysis, 
we first determine whether the Supreme Court has 
established a rule that governs Matteo's claim. The 
Supreme Court has not formally defined the term 
"government agent" for Sixth Amendment purposes. See 
Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 784, 793-94 (11th Cir. 1991) 
("There is, by necessity, no brightline rule for determining 
whether an individual is a government agent for purposes 
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."). In its sole case 
focusing on a determination of government agency, the 
Supreme Court found the informant was an agent because 
he was paid and "acting under instructions" from the 
government. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 270. The Court also 
cited facts that the informant was ostensibly a mere fellow 
inmate rather than a trusted friend of the defendant and 
that the defendant was in custody and under indictment at 
the time of the alleged elicitation. The Court did not 
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attempt to generalize these factors into a rule defining 
government agency for future cases, nor has it revisited 
them in subsequent cases. Consequently, although our 
analysis is informed by the facts emphasized in Henry, we 
do not believe the Supreme Court has announced a rule of 
sufficient specificity to merit "contrary to" review. Cf. 
O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 24 ("[T]he chief question is how 
specific a rule must be to qualify as dispositive, thus 
triggering review under the `contrary to' clause."). 
 
We next focus on whether the state court decision was 
based upon an objectively unreasonable application of 
existing law. The lower federal courts have explicated the 
holding of Henry in some detail: in particular, several have 
held that the existence of an express or implied agreement 
between the state and the informant is an additional factor 
supporting a finding of agency: "At a minimum .. . there 
must be some evidence that an agreement, express or 
implied, between the individual and a government official 
existed at the time the elicitation takes place." Depree, 946 
F.2d at 794; see also United States v. Taylor , 800 F.2d 
1012, 1016 (10th Cir. 1986); Thomas v. Cox, 708 F.2d 132, 
137 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Metcalfe, 698 F.2d 
877, 882 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Calder, 641 F.2d 
76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981). Applying this line of cases, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court determined that Lubking was 
not an agent because " `there was no agreement or prior 
arrangement between Lubking and the District Attorney or 
the police; Lubking did not receive any compensation for 
the information he provided; he had no history of acting as 
a paid informant; and Lubking went to the police of his own 
volition after he had initially been contacted by the 
Defendant on January 28, 1988.' " Commonwealth v. 
Matteo, No. 01158, mem. op. at 10 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 
1991) (quoting trial court opinion). 
 
Matteo disputes this conclusion on several grounds. 
First, he contends the state court erred in finding that 
Lubking received no compensation or benefit for his aid to 
the police. Although it is agreed that Lubking received no 
monetary compensation, Matteo argues Lubking's decision 
to cooperate with authorities was motivated by his desire 
not to become a suspect in the investigation of 
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Calandriello's murder. As such, Matteo claims, the 
arrangement between Lubking and the police amounted to 
a "quid pro quo" exchange in which the police agreed not to 
investigate Lubking in return for his cooperation. Such a 
quid pro quo -- in which the informant receives some type 
of benefit, even if nonpecuniary, in exchange for assisting 
the authorities -- may constitute evidence of an agency 
relationship. See United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 423 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[W]e believe the Court meant that any 
informant who is offered money, benefits, preferential 
treatment, or some future consideration, including, but not 
limited to, a reduction in sentence, in exchange for eliciting 
information is a paid informant."). As noted, Matteo 
contends that Lubking cooperated in order to prevent 
himself from becoming a suspect in the investigation. 
Whatever Lubking's motivation, the record amply supports 
the state court's determination that no deal was struck 
between Lubking and the police. Lubking himself testified 
as follows: 
 
        Q. Now, prior to these calls, did the police make any 
        threats to you? 
 
        A. No. 
 
        Q. Any promises? 
 
        A. Nope. 
 
        Q. Did you have any deal with them? 
 
        A. No. 
 
        Q. Were you paid for cooperating with the police? 
 
        A. No. 
 
        Q. What if any benefit did you receive [for] helping 
        them? 
 
        A. None. 
 
This testimony was corroborated by that of Chester County 
Detective Carroll, who testified that there was no deal of 
any kind between Lubking and the police. Furthermore, 
Detective Lampman, also of the Chester County Detective's 
Office, testified that Lubking was not scheduled to be 
interviewed as part of the investigation, thus belying 
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Matteo's argument that Lubking cooperated to deflect 
suspicion from himself. Nor was there any evidence 
suggesting that Lubking believed he was a suspect in 
Calandriello's killing. We will not speculate or infer the 
existence of a quid pro quo agreement simply because the 
informant's motives may not have been entirely altruistic. 
The record shows that Lubking was not a suspect in the 
crime, had little to gain by cooperating with the 
investigation, and in fact received no compensation or 
benefits of any kind. Under these circumstances, we agree 
with the state court that Lubking neither sought nor 
received any benefit for his cooperation with the police. 
 
Matteo next argues that Lubking was acting under 
instructions from the police, a factor identified in Henry, 
see 447 U.S. at 270, but not relied upon by the state court. 
Matteo cites the fact that authorities showed Lubking how 
to use the recording equipment on the phone and directed 
him not to ask questions or otherwise elicit information 
from Matteo. We do not believe these instructions are the 
kind contemplated by Henry. The instruction on how to 
operate the recording device was trivial and does not pose 
a problem of constitutional dimension. As for the 
instruction not to elicit information from Matteo, it would 
be perverse to hold that police informants may not 
deliberately elicit information and yet to forbid police from 
notifying potential informants of this fact. In many 
circumstances, such a holding would preclude police from 
using informants at all, a result we find untenable. 
Consequently, we are not convinced by Matteo's argument 
that Lubking was acting under police instructions. 
 
On the other hand, there is some evidence of an agency 
relationship in this case. Lubking was not a jailhouse 
acquaintance, but a trusted friend of Matteo's. See 447 U.S. 
at 270. The police therefore knew that Matteo would be 
relatively more likely to make incriminating statements to 
Lubking. In addition, Matteo was in custody at the time of 
the elicitation. See id. (examining whether defendant was in 
custody with formal charges pending when the 
incriminating statements were elicited). As the Supreme 
Court has held, "the mere fact of custody imposes 
pressures on the accused; confinement may bring into play 
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subtle influences that will make him particularly 
susceptible to the ploys of undercover Government agents." 
Id. at 274. The use of an informant in these circumstances 
"intentionally creat[es] a situation likely to induce [the 
accused] to make incriminating statements without the 
assistance of counsel," and therefore is significant to a 
finding of agency. Id. At the time of his conversations with 
Lubking, Matteo had been arrested for murder, 
preliminarily arraigned, and incarcerated. Certainly, the 
"special pressures" of custody were present. 
 
On balance, however, we agree with the state court that 
Lubking was not acting as a government agent at the time 
of the phone calls. To the extent the issue is a close one, 
AEDPA directs us to defer to the state court decision. See 
O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 27 ("We regard the question as a close 
one -- but, under AEDPA's newly minted standard of 
review, the very closeness of the call militates strongly 
against the granting of habeas relief."). Therefore, we hold 
the state court's decision was not contrary to, or an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme 
Court precedent. 
 
C. Deliberate Elicitation 
 
Under Massiah and its progeny, the petitioner also must 
show "deliberate elicitation" of incriminating statements by 
the police informant. Matteo argues that Lubking 
deliberately elicited incriminating statements from him in 
both the first and second telephone conversations. In the 
first conversation, Matteo claims, Lubking deliberately 
elicited information about the location of the gun by falsely 
telling Matteo he was not working for the police. This 
falsehood allegedly induced Matteo to tell Lubking where 
the gun was hidden. Regarding the second conversation, 
Matteo bases his claim on the fact that Lubking asked 
several questions about the precise location of the gun: for 
example, "So it's not in the grass?"; "So it's almost 
underneath the bridge?"; "Was it frozen?"; and "Was the 
water frozen when you dropped it?" We must determine 
whether the state court's decision that these statements did 
not qualify as "deliberate elicitation" was contrary to, or an 
unreasonable application of, the relevant Supreme Court 
precedent. 
 
                                31 
  
The Supreme Court has made clear that "the primary 
concern of the Massiah line of decisions is secret 
interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the 
equivalent of direct police interrogation." Kuhlmann v. 
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986). Accordingly, a defendant 
does not prove a Sixth Amendment violation "simply by 
showing that an informant, either through prior 
arrangement or voluntarily, reported his incriminating 
statements to the police. Rather, the defendant must 
demonstrate that the police and their informant took some 
action, beyond merely listening, that was designed 
deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks." Id. Applying 
this reasoning, the Court in Kuhlmann found no 
constitutional deprivation where police placed a man who 
had previously agreed to act as an informant in the same 
jail cell as the suspect, who then spontaneously made 
incriminating remarks to the informant. The lesson of 
Kuhlmann, we believe, is that the use of an informant -- 
even surreptitiously and through prior arrangement-- does 
not violate the Sixth Amendment so long as the informant 
merely listens to and reports the incriminating statements, 
rather than affirmatively seeking to induce them. See Brink, 
39 F.3d at 422 (noting that the Sixth Amendment requires 
an informant to be no more than a passive "listening post"). 
In this sense, the limitations on police conduct are 
analogous to those imposed by the entrapment defense, 
where police may use undercover agents to afford 
opportunities to break the law but may not affirmatively 
"originate a criminal design" or "implant in an innocent 
person's mind the disposition to commit a criminal act." 
Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1992) (citing 
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932)). 
 
Matteo argues his case is more similar to Maine v. 
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985), in which the Supreme Court 
held the Sixth Amendment forbids "knowing exploitation by 
the State of an opportunity to confront the accused without 
counsel being present." Id. at 176; accord Henry, 447 U.S. 
at 274 (holding that the Sixth Amendment forbids the state 
from "intentionally creating a situation likely to induce 
[defendant] to make incriminating statements without the 
assistance of counsel"). In Moulton, however, the informant 
actively induced the defendant to make incriminating 
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statements by feigning memory loss about the events of the 
night in question: "Apologizing for his poor memory, he 
repeatedly asked Moulton to remind him about the details 
of what had happened, and this technique caused Moulton 
to make numerous incriminating statements." 474 U.S. at 
166. For example, at one point the informant asked "I want 
you to help me with some dates. . . . [W]hat night did we 
break into Lothrop Ford? What date?" Id. at 166 n.5. He 
also " `reminisced' about events surrounding the various 
thefts, and this technique too elicited additional 
incriminating statements from Moulton." Id. at 166. 
Similarly, in Henry the informant took "affirmative steps" to 
elicit incriminating information. 447 U.S. at 271. 
 
In contrast, Lubking's conduct did not approach this 
level of deliberate elicitation in either phone call. Lubking 
did not prompt Matteo to disclose the gun's location; 
rather, Matteo voluntarily called Lubking on January 27 
and asked Lubking to retrieve the gun for him, obviously in 
an attempt to prevent the police from finding the murder 
weapon. Plainly, it was necessary for Matteo to tell Lubking 
where the gun was hidden. In fact, the entire purpose of 
Matteo's calls to Lubking was to enlist his help in locating 
the rifle, a task that necessarily required Matteo to furnish 
Lubking with details of the gun's location. Although we 
recognize that it is unimportant whether Matteo initiated 
the contact with Lubking, see Moulton, 474 U.S. at 174, we 
believe the voluntariness of Matteo's disclosure is relevant 
to the issue of elicitation. Furthermore, we note that after 
being notified of Matteo's initial request, the police merely 
"listened in" as Matteo provided the information that was 
essential for Lubking to carry out the task. In the first 
conversation, Lubking said virtually nothing at all, causing 
Matteo to grow suspicious and question whether he was 
"getting set up." This pattern was repeated in the second 
phone call, as Matteo willingly provided a detailed 
description of the gun's location and Lubking responded 
almost exclusively with monosyllabic rejoinders such as 
"okay," "yeah," "uh-huh," and the like.3 The fact that near 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. According to appellee's brief, Lubking responded "okay," "yeah," or 
"uh-huh" 73 times in the first conversation, which lasted 10 minutes, 
and 32 times in the second, which lasted approximately 5 minutes. 
Regardless of the precise number of such responses, appellee is correct 
that both conversations consisted almost entirely of detailed statements 
by Matteo followed by one-word answers from Lubking. 
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the end of the second call Lubking asked a few clarifying 
questions, which were directly responsive to statements 
Matteo had just made, does not alter the fundamental 
nature of the exchange between the two men: namely, 
Matteo enlisted Lubking's help to track down the murder 
weapon and voluntarily provided him with the information 
necessary to do so.4 
 
We are also not convinced by Matteo's argument that 
deliberate elicitation is proved by Lubking's statements in 
the first conversation that he was not acting at the behest 
of police. Although the statements were false, we are aware 
of no rule suggesting that deliberate elicitation occurs 
whenever an informant misrepresents that he is not 
cooperating with authorities. Matteo claims such a principle 
is established by the following statement in Moulton: "By 
concealing the fact that [the informant] was an agent of the 
State, the police denied [defendant] the opportunity to 
consult with counsel and thus denied him the assistance of 
counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 177. 
But we do not interpret this language to mean that police 
informants must disclose, if asked, that they are 
cooperating with the authorities, or else any incriminating 
statements made to them are excluded by the Sixth 
Amendment. If that were the case, criminal suspects could 
easily circumvent all undercover investigative techniques. 
Rather, "[w]hen an accused voluntarily chooses to make an 
incriminatory remark in these circumstances, he knowingly 
assumes the risk that his confidant may be untrustworthy." 
Henry, 447 U.S. at 297-98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 
We agree with the Pennsylvania Superior Court's 
determination that Lubking did not deliberately elicit 
incriminating information from Matteo in either phone call. 
Certainly, we do not believe the state court decision 
contravened established Supreme Court precedent to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. To hold that Lubking's few clarifying questions constituted "deliberate 
elicitation" under Massiah would imply that a Sixth Amendment 
violation hinged on whether Matteo successfully communicated the rifle's 
location on the first try. We do not believe Matteo's inability to do so 
affects the substance of the conversations, both of which make clear 
Matteo voluntarily disclosed the rifle's location. 
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extent that it could be characterized as "contrary to" the 
applicable body of law. Nor do we find its holding to be an 
objectively "unreasonable application of" this law. As noted, 
the "primary concern" of the Massiah doctrine is to 
proscribe "secret interrogation by investigatory techniques 
that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation." 
Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459; Moulton, 474 U.S. at 177 n.13 
(finding Sixth Amendment violation because the elicitation 
in that case was " `the functional equivalent of 
interrogation' ") (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 277 (Powell, J., 
concurring)). In this case, it was objectively reasonable for 
the state court to conclude that police conduct did not 
amount to surreptitious interrogation of Matteo but 
consisted merely of listening as Matteo voluntarily revealed 
incriminating information to Lubking. Consequently, we do 
not believe the state court's decision was contrary to, or an 
unreasonable application of, the Massiah line of cases. 
 
IV. Harmless Error 
 
We also note that even if a Sixth Amendment violation 
had occurred, we would still affirm on the grounds that the 
state court's failure to exclude the recorded conversations 
and the gun was harmless. The other evidence against 
Matteo, although circumstantial, was very strong. The jury 
still would have been presented evidence that Lubking 
loaned Matteo a .22 caliber rifle that was never returned 
and that this rifle was consistent with the type of gun that 
killed Calandriello. Additionally, the following facts still 
would have been presented to the jury: Matteo and 
Calandriello had scheduled a meeting for noon on January 
13, 1998; Calandriello left for this meeting and never 
returned; Calandriello's car and apartment keys were found 
in Matteo's apartment along with a wad of $100 bills 
similar to the bills Calandriello told friends he would bring 
to the meeting with Matteo; Matteo was picked up by John 
Stanchina at the Holiday Inn parking lot where the body 
was soon found; blood consistent with Calandriello's and 
only 3 percent of the population was found in Matteo's 
garage; and Matteo's sneakerprint was found on the rear 
bumper of the car containing the body. Under these 
circumstances, we believe the admission of the 
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conversations and the gun had no " `substantial and 
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 
verdict.' " California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996) (quoting 
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). We 
therefore find it unnecessary to decide whether the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court correctly concluded that the 
police inevitably would have discovered the gun. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The state court decision was neither contrary to, nor an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Accordingly, the District Court correctly dismissed Matteo's 
habeas petition. 
 
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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